ABSTRACT: The matter of disclosure of donor conception to donor offspring is a very contentious issue. A frequently mentioned argument is that disclosure is in the best interest of the child. The objectives of this paper are 2-fold: first, to find out whether there are any measureable, stable differences in the psychological well-being of donor offspring who are informed of the mode of their conception compared to those who are not, and second, to find out what is being done with the evidence. We found that there exists no empirical evidence of differences in psychological well-being of donor offspring in disclosing or nondisclosing families. Regarding the age of disclosure, the findings are inconclusive. Some studies indicate no difference and some show slight positive effects of early disclosure. We also found that authors tend to ignore their own findings when formulating recommendations and that the recommendations are based on implicit moral premises. We conclude that disclosure, and directive counseling towards disclosure, cannot be justified by the welfare of the donor offspring.
Introduction
The matter of disclosure of donor conception to donor offspring is a very contentious issue. All kinds of arguments can be advanced for and against disclosure. An argument that is frequently mentioned in the debate is that disclosure is in the best interest of the child. This paper will answer the question formulated by Klock: 'Are there any measureable, stable differences in the psychological well-being of donor offspring who are informed of the mode of their conception compared to those who are not?' (Klock, 2013) . Given this focus, I will ignore deontological arguments such as 'the child has the right to know about his or her donor conception' or 'it is wrong to lie', because deontological arguments cannot be falsified or corroborated by empirical evidence. I will focus on the psychosocial studies to find out whether there is evidence to show that disclosure of donor conception is in the best interests of donor offspring.
Telling or not-telling
Three different lines of information would help to answer the question: a comparison in well-being between children who have been told and those who have not; information on the well-being of children who have not been told, and information on children who have been told. The latter two lines of information are less useful to answer our question since we can no longer compare: we can no longer say that it is better to disclose or not to disclose but only that it is good or that it does not harm the offspring to do one or the other. I present the data starting with the studies of children who were not told, then studies on the comparison between those who were told and those who were not, and ending with those who were told, including the age of telling.
Information on children not told
Many studies performed around the turn of the century compared families created through different methods of conception. These studies have shown that there were no significant differences in parentchild relationships or child development in donor-conceived families when compared with natural conception or IVF families (Golombok et al., 1996 (Golombok et al., , 1999 Murray et al., 2006; Owen and Golombok, 2009 ). All these papers are presenting the results of a single longitudinal study looking at the children at the ages of 6, 12 and 18. Nevertheless, these studies are an important source of evidence on the effects of nondisclosure since the families participating in these studies had either not disclosed the donor origin to their offspring or very few of them had done so. In none of these studies, indications were found that these children had psychological problems. In summary, there are no negative consequences in the parent-child relationship or child development because of nondisclosure of the child's donor origin (Klock, 2013) .
However, one has to keep in mind that, apart from the Owen and Golombok study, the participants in all studies were (pre)adolescents. Extrapolation into adulthood is not possible. In addition, the single origin of the papers makes it all the more important that other scholars conduct similar research in other countries and settings.
Comparison between told and not told offspring
There are only five publications that compared disclosing and nondisclosing families. I leave out the studies in which comparisons are made between parents who intended to tell and those who did not because evidence shows that intention to tell does not mean they will actually tell (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2013). The first study is by Golombok et al. (2002) who compared the children (aged 11-12 years) who had been told (only 8.5%) with those who had not been told and did not find differences for the variables related to parentchild relationships and children's socio-emotional functioning. In a second publication from the same group, children who were unaware of their donor origins did not show higher levels of adjustment problems. On the contrary, children who were told and whose mothers were distressed showed greater adjustment difficulties . Freeman and Golombok (2012) looked into a small unbiased sample of children aged between 10 and 14 years. In this study, no significant differences were found between the psychological well-being of the children who were told and those who were not told. Some differences were found in parent-child relationships: disclosure was associated with lower levels of conflict between mothers and sons, and with less warm father-child relationships. Kovacs et al. (2015) also in a unbiased group, found no significant and clinically relevant differences in parent-child relationships and child well-being between the told and not told group. The most recent study by Ilioi et al. again shows no overall differences between disclosing families and either nondisclosing or natural conception families (Ilioi et al., 2016) . This study looked at the variables relating to quality of parenting, quality of mother-child relationships, global family functioning and adolescent psychological adjustment. In summary, no significant differences regarding child well-being were found.
Information on children being told
This part is divided in offspring being told early and those being told late. A major problem here is that different ages are adopted to define early and late telling. Some studies make distinctions between before 12, between 12 and 17 and after 18 (Hammarberg et al., 2015) , others between before 3, between 4 and 6, and between 7 and 14 (Ilioi et al., 2016) , and still others before and after 18 (Jadva et al., 2009; Mahlstedt et al., 2010) . From a theoretical point of view, these limits may have different implications. Some clarity and consensus would be useful for future research. Moreover, it has been pointed out that disclosure is a gradual process that, in different layers, may go on for years. Does 'early' and 'late' than refer to the start of the process or the completion of the process?
The studies indicate that children who have been told about their donor conception in their preschool years are doing fine and mostly react with curiosity or disinterest to the information (Rumball and Adair, 1999; Lycett et al., 2005; MacDougall et al., 2007) . The evidence for the older group (adolescence or adult) generally presents a more negative picture (Turner and Coyle, 2000; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2013) . In this group, many donor-conceived persons felt negative emotions such as shock, anger and confusion when learning of their donor conception (Jadva et al., 2009) . The negative effects of telling late play an important role in the whole debate since they are used as an argument to tell early and as an argument to tell. The latter point, however, only makes sense if one assumes that a (large) number of the donor conceived will find out anyway, through accidental or inadvertent disclosure by others or after genetic testing. Although anecdotal evidence exists about such disclosures, no reliable information is available on the frequency or extent of this happening.
The results on late disclosure should be interpreted with caution. First, almost all studies recruited participants from donor offspring support groups. This clearly leads to a selection bias both in terms of attitude and in terms of convictions about certain factors like the importance of genetic information. Second, no unbiased information is available on donor offspring who found out at a later age. It is possible that many people who found out late do not have psychological problems and thus keep under the radar. Third, when all studies on the effects of age of disclosure are brought together, the conclusion seems to be that the effect of age of disclosure is at best small. Three studies demonstrate no difference between children who have been told early versus children who have been told late in life (Paul and Berger, 2007; Mahlstedt et al., 2010; Hammarberg et al., 2015) versus two studies that demonstrate more negative effects of being told late (Jadva et al., 2009; Ilioi et al., 2016) . Hammarberg et al. (2015) found that recalled age at which they learned about the mode of conception was not associated with the offsprings' current subjective well-being or parental relationship. It is, however, unclear from this paper whether this finding was also true for those conceived with donor gametes. Mahlstedt et al. (2010) found no significant relationship between age at disclosure and attitude toward donor conception in participants who were part of a support group. In the third study by Paul and Berger (2007) , no association was found between age at time of disclosure, thus challenging theoretical and clinical beliefs that early disclosure is beneficial to family functioning. Two studies reported positive effects correlated with earlier age of disclosure. The first study reported more negative feelings at the moment of questioning in the group who had been told after the age of 18 (Jadva et al., 2009) and the second study showed higher levels of psychological well-being in those who learned about their genetic origins before age seven compared to those who were told after age 7 (Ilioi et al., 2016) . Taking all these studies together, no clear conclusion about age of disclosure can be drawn.
Findings and conclusions/ recommendations
When studying the relationship between findings on the one hand and conclusions/recommendations on the other hand in the debate on disclosure, two points are interesting: a large deviation or contradiction between the findings and the conclusions/recommendations, and conclusions based on implicit moral premises.
First, there seems to be a trend of authors to ignore their own findings and reservations when it comes to drawing conclusions or making recommendations. Some examples (quotes are used to ensure that no distortion in reformulation would slip in): Kovacs et al. (2015) found no significant and clinically relevant differences in parent-child relationships and child well-being between the told and not told group. As a conclusion, the authors state that 'although there is no evidence that nondisclosure detracts from the well-being of parents and donorconceived children, there is a culture of valuing openness in contemporary Australian families and other important motives for telling DI children about their conception, including a belief that a child has a fundamental right to be told, wanting to avoid the burden of guarding the secret and a desire to prevent accidental discovery'. One wonders why they have done the study in the first place. A similar reasoning pattern can be found in Golombok et al. (2011) : 'No differences between family types were found for maternal negativity, showing that conflict and hostility between mothers and children is no higher in nondisclosing than disclosing gamete donation families or natural conception families. In addition, the children were found to be functioning well.' (…) 'The less positive interaction between mothers and children in nondisclosing families was not associated with emotional or behavioral problems in the children, given that no differences were found between the nondisclosing families and the other family types for any of the measures of child psychiatric disorder' (Golombok et al., 2011) . Nevertheless, the conclusion by the authors was that 'the findings of the present study similarly suggest that assisted reproduction families may benefit from disclosure to children about the nature of their conception before they enter school'. The final example comes from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics that agrees that the evidence is patchy and that children are doing well until early adolescence, but still states that there is 'sufficient evidence to point to the conclusion that, other things being equal, it will usually be better for children to be told, by their parents and at an early age, that they are donor-conceived' (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2013). The logical conclusion from 'no difference' or insufficient evidence is that no recommendations can be issued, or at best, that all options are equally good. It seems that the authors' moral convictions, i.e. that parents should disclose and the child has a right to know, can easily survive non-fitting or contradictory empirical findings.
Second, the conclusions/recommendations can only be reached when implicit moral premises are introduced. It is a basic rule in ethics that normative conclusions cannot be deduced from descriptive (empirical) premises. This is only possible when at least one normative premise is added. Let me give a simple example. Empirical premise: smoking endangers the health of smokers. Normative conclusion: we should discourage or forbid smoking. This conclusion cannot be drawn without adding a normative premise like 'health is good'. In the debate on disclosure, many normative premises are assumed but rarely made explicit. One study found 'lower mother-child mutuality and maternal positivity in donor insemination and egg donation families in which the child was unaware of his or her donor conception in comparison to naturally conceived families' . In another, late disclosure was associated with higher levels of distress in offspring (Jadva et al., 2009) . What do such findings imply? Does this mean that parents should tell and tell early? No, unless one introduces a normative rule such as: 'Parents should (have a moral obligation to) avoid those things (actions, decisions …) that cause (are linked to) negative feelings in their offspring'. Or, put in a positive way: 'Parents should (have a moral obligation to) do those things that increase (might lead to) positive feelings in their offspring'. This rule cannot be adopted as such. First, there are then hundreds of things that parents should be doing or should avoid doing. We would end up in an absurdly demanding situation. Second, the rule ignores the fact that negative feelings in children are frequently an inevitable consequence of actions, events, and decisions in a family and they may be justified by connected positive consequences for the children and other people involved. Research has shown that children in lesbian households suffer from stigmatization because of their parents' sexual orientation (Bos and Van Balen, 2008) . If we apply the rule above, we should recommend that lesbian women should not have children. Third, in many instances we will find both positive and negative effects of disclosure. In the Freeman and Golombok study, disclosure was simultaneously associated with lower mother-son conflict and less warm father-child relationships (Freeman and Golombok, 2012) . So what do we value most? It is worth pointing out that in all studies we are talking about gradual differences well within the range of normality. Nevertheless, the underlying idea seems to be that parents should try to have the best possible, warmest and least conflictuous relationship with their child. And this, presumably, will lead to the happiest child.
The main problem with the implicit rule is that it is based on a maximizing principle. All these problems can be solved by adopting a threshold of harm principle rather than to try to maximize child wellbeing: parents should not do those things that have a high chance of leading to serious harm (Pennings, 1999) . This is the degree of parental autonomy we also respect in natural reproduction. And this threshold of harm is certainly neither reached in the case of nondisclosure, nor in case of late disclosure.
Theoretical arguments
Within the debate on disclosure, several theories are appealed to: the effects of family secrets on family functioning, theories about identity formation, etc. In the introduction to papers on disclosure, one keeps repeating these points and theories even though the findings from the empirical research cast doubts on them. Take family secrets as an example. It has been argued that secrecy will have an adverse effect on family relationships and, consequently, on the child (Golombok et al., 2011) . However, as far as the present evidence goes, this belief has proven to be false in the case of donor conception. The studies that compared disclosing and nondisclosing families showed no differences, neither in child well-being, nor in parent-child relationships. So the claim made by counselors and psychologists that secrecy interferes with relationship dynamics and child adjustment has been shown to be wrong, at least in the early and middle childhood years (Kovacs et al., 2015) . There are many possible reactions to a discrepancy between empirical findings and theoretical positions. One possibility is that the theory is wrong and should be amended. Many people and families conceal a secret: it is inherent to human interaction (Vangelisti and Caughlin, 1997) . Recent research has shown that whether or not a secret is harmful depends (amongst other things) on the motivation for keeping the secret. Caughlin and Afifi found for instance that when the motivation for avoiding a topic was the protection of the relationships, a diminishment in negative association between avoidance and dissatisfaction appeared (Caughlin and Afifi, 2004) . If none of the, admittedly scarce, empirical studies demonstrate negative effects of nondisclosure, it seems to be time to either revise the theory or to look for an explanation.
After reviewing the evidence, one starts wondering where this consensus on the effects of disclosure on the child's well-being among counselors and psychologists comes from. A possible explanation, one that comes forward in the report by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, is that they attach too much weight to the opinion of a certain part of one party, i.e. donor offspring linked to donor offspring support groups. As I mentioned above, the negative effects are only confirmed in a preselected group of people and moreover, it assumes that people will find out late, which is not demonstrated. Another possible answer is that their position has little to do with science or evidence but everything with their moral convictions (Nordqvist, 2014) . They believe that parents should be honest with their child, that the child has a right to know, etc. There is nothing wrong with holding these convictions but they should be open about it. They should not pack these claims in a psychological bag, presented as scientific fact. The fault that was made at the start of the introduction of sperm donation is now repeated in the reverse direction. Then it was claimed without any evidence that disclosure may be damaging for the child's psychological and social well-being. Now it is claimed, again without any evidence, that disclosure is in the best interest of the child. Evidence-based advice still remains a far-away dream.
This moral conviction of counselors and psychologists can also be seen in the negative attitude towards nondisclosing parents. It is frequently mentioned that a group of parents would like to disclose but are uncertain about how and when to do it (Hammarberg et al., 2015) . Many papers are dedicated to designing ways and methods to help these parents disclose (Leeb-Lundberg et al., 2006) . However, not one single article gives advice on how parents who do not want to disclose can be helped. If counselors would be morally neutral and not impose their values on parents, they would also try to better prepare parents who do not want to tell. This could be done by training them in giving convincing answers to the children's questions, by pointing out to parents at which points in their child's life they may expect questions, by running through scenarios that are likely to bring up the subject and by helping them to build a coherent and easy to maintain story. Such training and practice could help parents to uphold their story without topic avoidance so that negative effects of topic avoidance on family functioning can be avoided (Paul and Berger, 2007) .
Conclusion
The question 'are there any measureable, stable differences in psychological well-being of donor offspring who are informed of the mode of their conception compared to those who are not?' should be answered in the negative. Given the lack of evidence, the current directive position on disclosure is in essence a moral conviction, based on mainly deontological arguments. The absence of evidence of harm to children should in a pluralistic society be a reason for restraint. For counselors and practitioners, this restraint is moreover strongly supported by the general principle of non-directiveness. For the government, restraint is appropriate out of respect for the moral convictions of others, in this case the parents. There might be good reasons to argue for disclosure but the best interest of the child is not one of them.
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